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NOTES AND COMMENTS
effect is telling the modern highwaymen how to ply their trade without
civil liability,2 1 except for their plunder. The formula is simple: "Show
your blackjacks, but don't move them or touch your victims."
WARREN A. SEAvEY*
Conflict of Laws-Tort and Partial "Release" in Different
Jurisdictions-What Law Governs Construction of Instrument.
At common law a release of one joint tort-feasor results in the re-
lease of all others. It makes no difference whether the respective acts
of the several tort-feasors were in concert, merely concurrent, or even
successive ;1 it matters only that the combined acts produced a single,
indivisible injury.2 The reason generally assigned for this result is that
a single injury represents a single cause of action, which cannot be split
by being released as to one tort-feasor while being preserved as to
another. A release is thus regarded as an absolute, unconditional ex-
tinction of a cause of action.3 This reasoning gave rise to the judicial
presumption that a release, even if granted to less than all who were
(allegedly) jointly responsible for the injury, was executed only in
exchange for a complete satisfaction of the claim. It was the view of
the courts, therefore, that to allow the injured party to release one joint
tort-feasor and subsequently to recover a judgment from another theo-
retically would permit the victim to recover more than he had lost
Assuming the soundness of this reasoning at the time at which it evolved,
it is nevertheless highly questionable whether the use of this irrebuttable
presumption is a just method of preventing excessive recoveries now.
211 assume that the defendants might have been bound over to keep the peace
or been charged with an attempt at extortion.
* Babcock Professor of Law, Wake Forest College. Professor of Law eneritus,
Harvard University.
1 Intentional torts by their very definition at common law must have been con-
current in order to give rise to joint tort-feasorship. See Garrett v. Garrett, 228
N.C. 530, 46 S.E.2d 302 (1948) ; PRossER, TORTS § 46, n. 29 (2d ed. 1955).
- Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co., 72 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; Morris
v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956) ; PRossER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 46.
A few American jurisdictions have attempted to make a common-law distinction
(both in negligent and intentional torts) between tort-feasors who act in concert
and those whose acts are merely concurrent. Husky Refining Co. v. Barnes, 119
F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1941) (Idaho law) ; Bee v. Cooper, 217 Cal. 96, 17 P.2d 740
(1932). There is a considerable variance between the laws of the several juris-
dictions as to the effect of a release given to one who is subsequently adjudged not
to have been jointly liable with those charged with the injury. See, e.g., Bolton v.
Ziegler, 111 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ind. 1953) ; Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal.2d
705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945) ; Holland v. Southern Pub. Util. Co., 208 N.C. 289, 180
S.E. 592 (1935); Howard v. J. H. Harris Plumbing Co., 154 N.C. 225, 70 S.E.
285 (1911) ; Harris v. City of Roanoke, 179 Va. 1, 18 S.E2d 303 (1942) ; Papenfu§
v. Shell Oil Co., 254 Wis. 233, 35 N.W.2d 920 (1949).
'Roper v. Florida Pub. Util. Co., 131 Fla. 709, 179 So. 904 (1938) ; PRossER,
op. cit. supra note 1, § 46.
'Lysfjord v. Flintkote Co., 135 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Cal. 1955) ; Morris v. Diers,
134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956).
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Today the situation often arises where one of several joint tort-
feasors wishes to settle his share of the injured party's claim without
resorting to the courts. The consideration paid for such a settlement
is usually the settling tort-feasor's fractional share of the total amount
claimed by the victim or a lesser amount agreed upon through com-
promise. In many American jurisdictions a general release given to the
settling tort-feasor, even where the instrument specifically reserves the
injured party's rights against other alleged tort-feasors, will still result
today in a complete extinction of the cause of action and a bar to further
recovery.5 This has led to the development and use of the covenant
not to sue, by which the settling tort-feasor can be protected from further
action by the plaintiff,6 leaving the plaintiff free to seek the remainder
of his damages from the other joint tort-feasors.7 The practical differ-
ence between a release and a covenant is virtually nil8 as far as the
settling tort-feasor is concerned. Many courts, however, continue to
adhere rigidly to the technical distinctions, finding a common law re-
lease wherever the traditional form and language appear, even though
the intent of the parties may otherwise be indicated plainly to the con-
trary.9 Some jurisdictions, however, have enacted statutes eliminating
the presumption and automatic extinction of the cause of action.10
Others have greatly lessened the harshness of the common law rule in
many instances by construing instruments as covenants, especially where
there is a specific reservation of rights against other joint tort-feasors
or an otherwise clear indication that the settlement was not made in
complete satisfaction of the injury." Apparently only Virginia still ad-
heres to the rule that any settlement with one or all joint tort-feasors
conclusively presumes a complete satisfaction which bars any further
recovery on the claim.12
Butler v. Norfolk So. Ry., 140 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.N.C. 1956) ; PaossER, op.
cit. supra note 1, § 46 and cases therein cited.
'What effect the settlement might have upon the other tort-feasors' right to
contribution from the settling tort-feasor varies among the jurisdictions. At com-
mon law the right to contribution was not recognized, but many states have enacted
contribution statutes with widely varying effect. The UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION
AMONG ToRTFatsoas Act § 5 provides that. the settling tort-feasor may be liable
to the other tort-feasors for his fractional share of the judgment rendered against
them, less the consideration paid for the release. To date this Act has been
adopted in Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and South Dakota.
'Lysfjord v. Flintkote Co., 135 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
'Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal.2d 705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945).
See generally PRossER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 46.10E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5481; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.060 (1953). For
those states which have enacted the UNIFORM CONTRIBuToN AMONG TORTPEASORS
Acr § 4, see note 6 supra.
"-United States ex rel Marcus v. Hess, 154 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1946) ; McKenna
v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Lysfjord v. Flintkkote Co., 135 F. Supp.
672 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Rector v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 263(S.D. Cal. 1952) ; Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 66 N.E. 133 (1903).
Shortt v. Hudson Supply & Equip. Co., 191 Va. 306, 60 S.E2d 900 (1950);
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With these varying attitudes among the several jurisdictions, a
problem arises where an injury occurs in one jurisdiction and a settle-
ment is executed in another. Such a problem was presented in De Bono
v. Bittner.'3  The defendant, Bittner, a resider, of New York, was in-
jured in an automobile accident in Virginia when struck head-on by
another motorist, also from New York, and immediately thereafter from
the rear by a Pennsylvania driver. Bittner and his two passengers, also
New York residents, settled their respective claims with the first driver.1 4
They executed general releases in favor of the driver while specifically
reserving their respective rights of action against all other joint tort-
feasors. The settlement was executed in New York, the resident juris-
diction of all parties thereto, and apparently all were represented and
advised by New York counsel who addressed themselves to New York
law. Clearly such an instrument would be regarded in New York, by
judicial interpretation, not as a common law release but as a covenant
not to sue.15 In this case Bittner's two passengers sued him, alleging
that he was jointly liable with the first driver for their injuries. The
court, recognizing that the situation presented a case of first impression,
held that under Virginia law the instrument had the legal effect of a
common law release and was thus a bar to further recovery by the plain-
tiffs. Also recognizing that New York law was apparently contem-
plated in the execution of the "release" (and that therefore the parties
did not intend to extinguish their claims), the court nevertheless held
that the instrument was so related to the tort as to be a matter of sub-
stantive right' 6 and "that this [right to enforce a tort claim] must there-
fore be governed by the law of the situs of the tort."'17
Bland v. Warwickshire Corp., 160 Va. 131, 168 S.E. 443 (1933). Compare Haney
v. Cheatham, 8 Wash. 2d 310, 111 P2d 1003 (1941) and Richardson v. Pacific
Power & Light Co., 11 Wash. 2d 288, 118 P.2d 985 (1941) zth Tucker v. Brown,
20 Wash. 2d 740, 150 P.2d 604 (1944). Pennsylvania apparently applied the pre-
sumption rule to all settlements prior to the enactment of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,.§ 2085 (Supp. 1958), in 1951, which incorporates the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act. Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co., 72 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa.
1947) ; Smith v. Roydhouse, Arey & Co., 244 Pa. 474, 90 Atl. 919 (1914). This
rule would seem to have been abrogated under the act. But compare Wilbert v.
Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co., 385 Pa. 149, 122 A.2d 406 (1956) with Caplan
v. Pittsburgh, 375 Pa. 268, 100 A.2d 380 (1953).
"313 Misc. 2d 333, 178 N.Y.S2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd mem. 10 App. Div.
2d 556, 196 N.Y.S2d 595 (1960).
" The settlements were actually made with the driver's estate, the driver being
fatally injured in the accident.
" Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 66 N.E. 133 (1903).
1" Plaintiff argued that the contract was independent of the tort, that the lex
fori should govern'. The court said that a release went to the very right to main-
tain a tort action and was consequently substantive in nature. While it did not
specifically so state, the court was apparently relying upon the concept embodied
in the Restatement, Conflict of Laws to the effect that in the enforcement of tort
claims, the law of the situs of the tort can govern the substantive rights of the
parties. See note 19 infra.
'17178 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
19601
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The same result was reached in Bittner v. Little,18 a case growing
out of the same accident involved in De Bono. The defendant in the
latter case was here suing the Pennsylvania driver in the federal district
court in that state. Thus the case was heard by a court sitting in a
jurisdiction connected with neither the situs of the tort nor the place of
settlement. Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that the Pennsylvania
state court had never previously decided the issue, the court reached the
same result as that in De Bono and on much the same reasoning, appar-
ently relying upon its interpretation of the Restatement, Conflict of
Laws.
1 9
It is significant that not once in the trial or appellate phases of either
of these cases did any court discuss another important aspect of the
conflict of laws problem, to wit: the lex loci contractus, the law of the
place of contracting, generally governs the construction of a contract.20
While the lex loci delicti, the law of the tort situs, may determine the
rights of the parties as affected by a release or covenant, it does not seem
necessarily to follow that such jurisdiction's laws should govern the
construction of the instrument. Here the construction would involve
the determination of whether the instrument is a release or a covenant
not to sue. Certainly in this respect the law contemplated by the parties
(usually the lex loci contractus) should be paramount to the law of the
tort situs which, in these cases, is extremely fortuitous. It is submitted
that the rule applied in the above two cases constitutes an unwarranted
and unnecessary extension of the "vested rights" theory of the conflict of
laws. 2 ' It would seem that a more just result could be obtained if such
an instrument were construed in the light of the law under which it was
drawn.2 2 After the legal nature of the instrument had been thus ascer-
1 270 F2d 286 (3d Cir. 1959), afirming 168 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
19 The court cited Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 389 (1934) : "A liability to
pay damages for a tort can be discharged or modified by the law of the state which
created it." Quaere whether this or any other section of the Restatement makes
this an exclusive power of the tort situs.jurisdiction.
'0 As was mentioned in note 16 supra, the trial court in De Bono did discuss
the plaintiffs' contention that the lex fori should prevail, but even counsel appar-
ently failed to couch his argument in terms of the law as contemplated by the
parties.
21 The so-called vested rights theory conceives that the law of the jurisdiction
wherein the injury occurs vests in the victim a right of action which he may
enforce in any appropriate forum but entirely subject to the law which gave him
the right. It is upon this theory that the appropriate sections of the Restatement
are predicated. See 2 BEALE, THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS §§ 378.1, .2, 389.1 (1935) ;
GOODRICH, Co NFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6-9 (1949) ; Ehrenzweig, Release of Concurrent
Tortfeasors in the Conflict of Laws, 46 VA. L. REv. 712 (1960). See generally
RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcT OF LAws §§ 311-390 (1934).
" In Western Spring Serv. Co. v. Andrew, 229 F2d 413, 418 (10th Cir. 1956),
the court said in relation to a settlement in a multiple tort-feasor case: "These
contracts were made in Nebraska and would be controlled by the law of that state.
Whether they be construed as a release or a covenant not to sue . . . depends
tpon the intent of the parties since that is the controlling factor." Cf. Combined
Ins. Co. of America v. Bode, 247 Minn. 458, 77 N.W.2d 533 (1956). Unfortunately
the rule in the principal cases has been followed more often than not. See, e.g.,
[Vol. 39
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tained, its effect upon the rights of the parties to the tort action could
be determined by applying the lex loci delicti. In this way the laws of
the respective jurisdictions would receive their due weight in the deter-
mination of the overall effect of the settlement on the rights of the plain-
tiff and the tort-feasors.2 3
Although it might not have altered the result in these two cases, due
to Virginia's isolated position on all tort settlements, the application of
this rule could make a very decisive difference in other jurisdictions. In
North Carolina, for example, covenants not to sue are recognized, but
great significance is attached to the technical form and language used in
the instrument.24  Shapiro v. Embassy Dairy25 involved a situation
which was substantially similar to that in the two cases just discussed.
In this case the plaintiffs, New York residents, were injured in North
Carolina in a collision between the automobile in which they were riding
and the defendant's truck. Prior to this action they had settled with
their own driver, apparently also a New York resident. The settlement
was negotiated and executed in New York with an instrument, very like
the ones in De Bono and Bittner, which released the driver while spe-
cifically reserving the plaintiffs' rights against the other tort-feasors.26
The federal district court which tried the case conceded that a "release"
with reservation of a right of action had never confronted the North
Carolina court, but it determined that this state would construe the
instrument to be an absolute release of all joint tort-feasors.2 7  And
Smith v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 194 Fed. 79 (8th Cir. 1912) ("the contract by
its terms is tied to the tort!'); Preine v. Freeman, 112 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Va.
1953) ; Goldstein v. Gilbert, 125 W. Va. 250, 23 S.E.2d 606 (1942).
" The question then might arise as to what law should govern the right of the
remaining tort-feasors to contribution from the one who settled. Since it is the
lex fori which ultimately creates any right to contribution that may exist, through
the rendering of a judgment against the tort-feasors, it would seem just and con-
sistent to allow this law to control the creation and extent of such a right. This
seems particularly appropriate since this is a right which can never be affected
by any agreement between the plaintiff and the settling tort-feasor.2 Butler v. Norfolk So. Ry., 140 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.N.C. 1956).
"5112 F. Supp. 696 (E.D.N.C. 1953).
2 "I . . . remise, release and forever discharge the said Joseph J. Kirch [the
plaintiff's driver] and the Maryland Casualty Company [from any. claim] . . . I
ever had, now have or may have . . . upon or by reason of any matter, cause or
thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of these
presents... . I hereby expressly reserve all my rights against Embassy Dairy,
Ins. [sic.] and/or Augustus B. Bunce, arising out of accident which occurred on
February 13, 1949, on U.S. Route 301, near Wilson, N. C." 112 F. Supp. at 697.
"' The federal district court claimed to find support for its conclusion by way
of a dictum in Howard v. Harris Plumbing Co., 154 N.C. 224, 227, 70 S.E. 285,
286 (1911), where the North Carolina Supreme Court quoted Judge Cooley:
"where the bar accrues in favor of some of the wrongdoers by reason of what has
been received from or done in respect to one or more others, . . . the bar arises
not from any particular form that the proceeding assumes, but from the fact that
the injured party has actually received satisfaction, or what in law is deemed the
equivalent. Therefore, if he accepts the satisfaction voluntarily made by one, that
is a bar to all. And so a release of one releases all, although the release expressly
stipulates that the other defendants shall not be released." There is no other
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while acknowledging that under New York law the instrument would
be regarded as a covenant, the court nonetheless applied its version of
the North Carolina law to construe it as well as to determine its legal
effect upon the rights of the parties in the tort action. Again, this de-
cision was based solely upon the reasoning that since North Carolina
was the situs of the tort its laws should govern all phases of the de-
termination of the substantive rights in the tort action. Thus there
exists the anomaly of having one jurisdiction, which clearly recognizes
technical covenants not to sue, failing to give such effect to an instrument
which meets all of the requirements of a covenant in the jurisdiction in
which it was drawn and executed. This decision is objectionable for two
reasons. First, .it unduly extends the vested rights concept. Second, it
ignores the clear intentions and expectancies of the parties. The North
Carolina law, as pronounced by this court, continues to follow the
common-law rule of presuming complete satisfaction whenever the word
"release" appears in an instrument. If this be the true state of our law,
it is submitted that a statute ought to be enacted to require the courts
to look further than the mere technical form and language of an instru-
ment in determining if it has been executed in exchange for complete
satisfaction.
It should be emphasized that an inflexible application of the le% loci
contractus in construing the instrument of settlement is no more to be
advocated than a similar application of the lex loci delicti. Certainly in
adopting a conflicts rule the courts should be guided as much by a desire
for flexibility to meet unusual situations as by the desire for uniformity
and certainty of result.28 It would seem, however, that the paramount
consideration should be what law the parties contemplated in executing
the settlement and release. Conceivably, a specific stipulation as to the
law intended by the parties to govern the transaction would be con-
trolling unless such law were repugnant to the lex fori or the lex loci
delicti.29 Absent some clear indication of the governing law, the con-
struction should be made with regard to the law of the jurisdiction which
has had the most significant contacts with the settlement and release.
In the instant'cases, as in most, this would be the lex loci contractus,0
language in the Shapiro case to indicate that the court considered that the plaintiff
had received satisfaction in his settlement with the driver. In 1929, eighteen years
after the Howard case was decided, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-240 (1953) was amended
to allow contribution among tort-feasors. In view of this, quaere whether the
above quotation represents the law in North Carolina today.
11 COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWs 340-41
(1929).
" The choice of law should not be unlimited however; the law stipulated should
be that of a jurisdiction which has some significance with respect to the transaction.
See, e.g., Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Bode, 247 Minn. 458, 77 N.W.2d 533
(1956).
" Ironically, this approach has received its greatest support from the New
York courts. See, e.g., Smith v. American' Flange Mfg. Co., 139 F. Supp. 917
[Vol. 39
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In conclusion, it is submitted that any conflict of laws rule which
requires the application of a particular law irrespective of other relevant
factors is unsound. In a situation where a tort occurs in one jurisdic-
tion and a partial settelment in another, the inflexible administration of
the lex loci delicti in the construction of the legal nature of the instru-
ment of settlement will frequently work a substantial injustice through
the defeat of the plainly-expressed intent of the parties even where such
intent is not repugnant to the laws of either the forum or the situs of
the tort. This supremacy of the lex loci delicti, for which the courts
claim to find support in the Restatement, is nothing more nor less than
a sacricfice of justifiable flexibility for the sake of mere uniformity.
ALLAN W. MARKHAM
Demurrer Ore Tenus-Amendment-Relation Back.
In Stamey v. Rutherfordton Elec. Membership Corp.' the plaintiff
alleged separate causes of action for wrongful death and for pain and
suffering. The defendant answered, and the trial court sustained the
plaintiff's motion to strike several of the defenses alleged. On appeal
before the supreme court the defendant demurred ore tenus on the
ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. The demurrer ore tenus was sustained without preju-
dice to the plaintiff's right to move for leave to amend.
Twenty-five months after the accident the plaintiff amended the com-
plaint. The defendant demurred to the amended complaint on the
ground that the amendment constituted new matter and therefore was
barred by the statute of limitations. (The trial court sustained the de-
murrer. On appeal 2 the supreme court refused to allow the amendment
to relate back and held that the cause of action for wrongful death was
vulnerable to a proper plea of the statute of limitations.3
In many prior decisions the North Carolina court has classified a
plaintiff's complaint as either a "defective statement of a good cause of
action" or a "statement of a defective cause of action." 4 The court has
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) ; New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 1 App. Div. 24 629, 1;2
N.Y.S2d 879 (1956); Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 13 Mise. 2d 8,
174 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1957); cf. Bierman v. Marcus, 140 F. Supp. 66 (1).
N.J. 1956).
1247 N.C. 640, 101 S.E.2d 814 (1958).
2 249 N.C. 90, 105 S.E.2d 282 (1958).
* Since the statute of limitations can never be taken advantage of by demurrer,
Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510, 73 S.E2d 320 (1952), the court vacated the order
sustaining the demurrer and remanded the-cause.
' The substantive distinction between a defective statement of.a good ca'S2 and
a defective cause is discussed in 1 McINTOs H, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE & PRO-
cEDauu § 1189, at 644 (2d ed. 1956). A good definition of the two terms is set out
in Davis "v. Rhodes, 231 N.C. 71, 73, 56 S.E.2d 43, 45 (1949) : "When the defect
goes to the substance of the cause and not to the form of the statement, it is a
defective cause of action which cannot be made good by adding other allegations
1960]
